My research is primarily in epistemology. One area of focus is the epistemology of disagreement, especially highly controversial, apparently intractable disputes. A closely related inquiry concerns the foundations of epistemic rationality and the justification of fundamental epistemic systems and principles. My dissertation sits at the intersection of these two issues, and addresses the epistemology of ideology. I have additional interests in metaphysics, particularly questions regarding ontology and metaphysical methodology.
I'm currently writing a dissertation on the epistemology of ideology under the supervision of Richard Feldman. The project offers an account of ideological belief and its justification. I then consider the consequences of this account for questions of ideological conversion and ideological disagreement.
Ideology for Epistemologists: What is the Question?
Contemporary anlaytic epistemology has given little attention to ideology. In this paper, I provide a high-level overview of theoretical work on ideology from other subdisciplines. I then consider what the central questions might be for an epistemology of ideology. (Work in progress.)
Disagreeing about Paradigms
Deep disagreements involve not only disputes over particular claims, but conflict over the correct epistemic policies, practices, or systems. In this paper, I consider one type of deep disagreements, those over scientific paradigms. I show the difficulty of evaluating paradigms epistemically, and instead advocate for a pragmatic account of their justification. (Work in progress.)
Knowledge and Emotion
I argue that there is an affective condition on knowledge. In particular, that for an agent to know, they must be in certain affective states and not in other affective states. (Work in progress.)
Pragmatism, Skepticism, and Metaphysical Realism
I defend a version of pragmatism according to which, for a restricted class of beliefs, having good practical reasons in their favor is sufficient for them to be justified. I then show how this view might illuminate two philosophical puzzles: the skeptic's challenge to our knowledge of the external world and the dispute between metaphysical realsim and anti-realism. (Work in progress.)
I spent two years exploring the digital humanities and their applications for philosophical research as an Andrew W. Mellon Fellow in the Digital Humanities. To find out more about my experiences as a fellow you can view my digital portfolio here.